INTRODUCTION
In early 2016, a group of armed militants seized control of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in southeastern Oregon and occupied the refuge for some forty-one days. 1 Originally a protest against a sentence imposed on ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.43:781 a decade later. 9 All of these confrontations involved public-land users claiming that the federal government lacked authority to own and manage federal lands. 10 Some westerners have used state legislation to resist federal land ownership. For example, in 2012 the state of Utah enacted the Transfer of Public Lands Act (TPLA), which demanded that the federal government transfer ownership of most federal land in the state to Utah. 11 The state also threatened to file suit, claiming that the federal government violated its promises in the Utah Statehood Act to dispose of federal land. 12 In 2015 Wyoming passed a statute amending its trespass law to forbid collecting environmental data on private property, aimed at preventing the collection of data relevant to water quality problems caused by public-lands cattle grazing. 13 And several members of Congress from western states like Utah, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming introduced bills in 2016 that would require divesture of federal lands by one means or another. 14 The Republican Party platform in 2016 even contained a promise to convey federal lands to the states. 
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Efforts to seize control over federal lands have existed at least since the so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion" of the 1970s 16 -a response to federal efforts to reform federal-land management to be more sensitive to wildlife and watershed protection. 17 But when a self-proclaimed sagebrush rebel, Ronald Reagan, became president, the rebellion subsided. 18 A decade-and-a-half later, the Clinton Administration, under the leadership of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt (a rancher), proposed to reform rangeland regulations, prompting a socalled "County Supremacy Movement." 19 Although that movement bore no legal fruit, 20 it produced numerous unenforceable county ordinances that to this day proclaim that federal-land ownership within their borders is illegal. 21 Attempts to divest federal ownership of public lands have failed because for the last 175 years the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed Congress's broad authority 22 20. See, e.g., Gardner v. Stager, 103 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996) (barring an action to quiet title to federal lands and water rights under a Nevada state statute on grounds of federal sovereign immunity); Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting an argument that a state water right included an attendant right to graze on public land; thus, cancellation of a federal grazing lease was not taking of water rights); United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the argument that a rancher had an easement by necessity to cross federal lands due to his water rights for his cattle to access water sources on federal land). land policy and to manage public lands. 23 This long precedent suggests that no legal basis exists upon which courts may order such a divestiture, 24 despite the misleading legal advice influencing some of the militants. 25 Political efforts for divesture, however, present other issues, given the broad power Congress possesses under the Property Clause. Congress may have the authority to convey public lands to the states or privatize them. 26 In short, the divestiture of public lands from the federal government is mostly a political issue, not a legal one.
This Article examines contemporary controversies over federal public lands, which have now entered a new era-perhaps due to social networking that encourages armed confrontations-producing considerable threats to both public employees 27 and local communities. 28 
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) tries to protect such employees
by asking agencies to "confront the message, rather than the messenger." PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL. RESP., http://www.peer.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
28. In Malheur County, in the wake of the occupation, the local judge (the equivalent of a county commissioner) who opposed the Bundy militants survived a recall election with over 70 percent of the vote. See Andrew Selsky, Oregon County Keeps Judge Who Blocked Refuge Occupiers, WASH. TIMES (June 28, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/28/oregon-recall-election-linked-toarmed-takeover/. During the occupation, Oregonians started a petition to collect monetary pledges in order to fund the "most appropriate groups to combat the ignorance and hate of the Malheur NWR occupiers." By the end of the occupation, the movement, "Go Home Malheur" or #gohomemalheur had raised more than $135,000. GOHOMEMALHEUR, http://www.gohomemalheur.org/mission/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). The local Burns Paiute Tribe also voiced strong concerns against the occupation, arguing that "[c]ondoning the illegal occupation of a federal facility by armed lawbreakers only encourages others to believe they can behave in the same way, with impunity. 
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 787 of the Constitution and its consistent judicial interpretation over the centuries, retracing well-trod legal ground. Part III examines the protestors' legal claims against federal ownership of public lands. The claims of these "discontents" have no plausible credence in light of the long judicial history of consistent Property Clause interpretation. Part IV explores the political prospects of the federal-land divestiture movement in Congress, which, given the law explained in Part II, is where any resolution must occur. The Article concludes that divestiture threatens to radically alter public-land law and its long history of preventing land and resource monopolies. 29 Given that federal lands have always been central to American identity, and that divestiture threatens to engender great opposition and contentious litigation, 30 Congress and the President should proceed with caution.
I. BACKGROUND
The incident involving Ammon Bundy and his colleagues at Malheur Refuge in southeastern Oregon was hardly the first armed protest against public-land ownership. Just in the twenty-first century, such conflicts occurred at least five times, in Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and twice in Oregon. In this Part, we examine some of the most notable confrontations.
A. The Arizona Standoff
In 2002 in southeastern Arizona, the Klump family caused a conflict with BLM quite similar to the Bundy standoffs. The Klumps claimed ownership of public lands southeast of the Dos Cabezas Mountains. 31 After ten years of conflict, the federal district court in Tucson ordered Wally Klump to remove his cattle from the Badger Den and Simmons Peak Allotments. 32 When Klump refused to recognize BLM's jurisdiction over his cattle on public lands, federal officials jailed him until he removed his cows a year later, marking the end of the dispute. 33 The Klump incident resulted from the militants' misunderstanding of the Constitution and, like the Bundy affairs, intimidated public servants. Klump threatened a lethal response to efforts by BLM to remove the cattle, claiming Second Amendment protection. 34 
B. The Bundy Nevada Standoff
Although the Bundy standoff in Nevada captured widespread media attention in 2014, its origins date from two decades earlier. Cliven Bundy had stopped paying his grazing fees in the early 1990s, claiming that the federal government lacked authority over lands that his ancestors settled in the 1880s. 36 BLM filed suit against Bundy, and a federal district court ruled in favor of BLM in 1998. 37 Over the years, BLM tried to settle Bundy's unpaid grazing fees, which eventually amounted to over $1.2 million, but its efforts were unsuccessful. 38 The conflict intensified in 2014 when footage of a BLM agent using a stun gun on Bundy's son went viral on the Internet, and hundreds of armed militants came to Bundy's ranch to help defend him from the court order. 39 The standoff culminated in April 2014, when Bundy led his followers to retake the cattle that BLM had confiscated, resulting in more than four hundred armed followers confronting about fifty government agents. 40 Faced with a threat of armed conflict, BLM backed down and returned some of the cattle, while proceeding with administrative and judicial actions against Bundy. 41 Later, Bundy offered two defenses in court. First, he alleged that the land in question belonged to either Nevada or the local county. 42 Second, he argued that his ancestral use right preempted BLM's jurisdiction over federal land, denying the sovereignty of the federal government. 43 He even claimed that the Supreme Court had no authority to interpret law, and that the decisions of the 35 
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Court could not bind any state. 44 Consequently, he flatly rejected all of the Property Clause's jurisprudence concerning federal authority over public lands. 45 Although Cliven Bundy's argument failed in court, many ranchers celebrated his "[teaching] the federal government a lesson" and getting BLM to back down. 46 That "victory," however, came at a price, as more militants involved in the armed standoff have since faced indictment and jail time. 47 Bundy's legal prospects are dim 48 -even the Nevada Constitution, which expressly recognizes the supremacy of the federal government and of the Supreme Court, 49 conflicts with his argument. But Bundy has enjoyed some political momentum, including the backing of several Republican politicians. 50 While Cliven Bundy remained in Nevada, his son, Ammon, became the leading figure in the Malheur Refuge occupation.
C. The Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act
In 2012 state representative Ken Ivory of Utah sponsored a bill to transfer public lands to the state. 51 The TPLA demanded that the United States government gift the state over 30 million acres of public lands by December 31, 2014. 52 The TPLA resulted from growing state frustration over federal land ownership and management in Utah, where the federal government owns 44 Utah's efforts to obtain title to public lands constitute just one example of multiple bills introduced in western states for similar claims. Most of the other efforts rely on political, not legal arguments, 65 as these efforts represent a broader attempt to gather support to lobby Congress to gift federal lands to the states. This approach has a better chance of success than any legal claim. 66 in fact dispose of over seven million acres of land to the state in its Statehood Act and many more to private parties over the years, and the chief consideration for the state to join the Union was political equal footing, not proprietary benefits; (2) he mistakenly referred to the federal government as acquiring land through statehood, id. at 14, when it actually obtained the lands through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 with Mexico, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2 1848, 9 Stat. 922; (3) he alleged that if the federal government failed to sell its land, the state would not receive its "anticipated percentage" of 5 percent, Kochan, supra, at 15, but a failure to sell would not affect the disposition of revenues from the lands that were not sold; and (4) he maintained that failure to dispose conflicted with an "ethic" or "expectation" of disposal, id. at 16, but there's no language in the Statehood Act that could be interpreted as creating any vested rights in a particular number of acres the federal government must dispose. 65. See the congressional and political support mentioned supra notes 50-51. 66. See Part IV. After this Article was in press, the Associated Press obtained through the Freedom of Information Act a report of the Western Attorneys General, which agreed that (1) the Property Clause gives the federal government plenary authority to dispose of or reserve public lands at its discretion; (2) the Enclave Clause does not limit the scope of the Property Clause; and (3) neither the equal footing nor equal sovereignty arguments, proffered by the New Orleans law firm for the state of Utah, supra note 24, required federal disposition of public lands. W. ATT The Malheur Refuge occupation was not the first armed resistance to federal land management in Oregon. A similar standoff began in April 2015 when two gold miners in the Galice mining district received a non-compliance letter from BLM disputing their mining rights to the Sugar Pine Mine in southwestern Oregon. 67 To defend his alleged mining right, Rick Barclay asked the Oath Keepers of Josephine County for help, prompting numerous armed protesters to arrive and watch over the claim for six weeks. 68 Although BLM closed its office for a day because of threatening phone calls, the Galice standoff appeared more peaceable than the Malheur Refuge occupation. 69 The armed conflict ended when the Interior Board of Land Appeals agreed to hear the miners' administrative appeal, which remains ongoing as of this writing. 70 The miners challenged BLM's authority to manage surface rights, contending that the claims dated back to the 1870s, long before the 1955 Surface Resources Act directed federal land managers to protect surface resources affected by mining. 71 BLM maintained that it possessed surface rights authorizing the agency to regulate the mining claims. 72 Unlike Bundy's meritless ownership claim at the Malheur Refuge occupation, the Galice miners may have a credible legal argument concerning BLM's jurisdiction over their mining claims.
Acres-AGs, GREENWIRE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060043768 (citing and linking to the attorneys general's report).
67. See Davis, supra note 7 (explaining that a federal employee surveying the land for abandoned mines found impermissible equipment on site near Galice because the miners had no surface rights; the employee told Rick Barclay and George Backes that they needed to obtain federal approval before mining). 
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E. The Malheur Refuge Occupation
The Malheur Refuge occupation lasted six weeks and resulted in the arrest of at least twenty-five militants. 73 The leading figure of the occupation, Ammon Bundy was not an Oregon landowner, but he seized the opportunity provided by the Ninth Circuit's decision on the Hammonds' sentences 74 to advocate the Bundian interpretation of the Constitution and its public-land ramifications. Ironically, BLM and the local community had collaborated well over the years and had reached agreement in 2013 on a refuge management plan affecting grazing and wildlife and watershed protection. 75 Although the local population had expressed mixed feelings about the presence of the Bundy militants, 76 Bundy used the occupation to repeatedly declare federal land ownership unconstitutional, and BLM powerless to manage federal lands. 76. Oregonians started a petition to collect pledges in order to fund the "most appropriate groups to combat the ignorance and hate of the Malheur NWR occupiers." By the end of the occupation, the movement, "Go Home Malheur" or #gohomemalheur had raised more than $135,000. GOHOMEMALHEUR, supra note 28. The local Burns Paiute Tribe also voiced strong concerns against the occupation, arguing that "[c]ondoning the illegal occupation of a federal facility by armed lawbreakers only encourages others to believe they can behave in the same way, with impunity." Hammill, supra note 28. Harney County Judge Steve Grasty, who opposed the Bundy occupation, survived a recall election, with voters overwhelmingly (some 70 percent) rejecting the recall. See Selsky, supra note 28. On the other hand, some locals "have welcomed the occupation and the attention it has brought to local frustration over the management of federal lands. Although the occupation provided Bundy with a broader platform for his message, he risked a lengthy prison term. 78 However, the intense media coverage of the Malheur Refuge occupation may have buoyed the political momentum for Bundy's cause. 79 Whatever his political prospects may be, Bundy's legal claims are completely unfounded, as the next Parts demonstrate.
II. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS INTERPRETATION
This Part discusses the origins of the Property Clause and analyzes its interpretation by both the Supreme Court and Congress. The first subpart explains that the Property Clause ratified the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which aimed, among other things, to give the federal government control over western settlement, at least in the area north of the Ohio River. The second subpart discusses the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting federal power under the Property Clause, which the Court consistently held to be "without limitation." The third subpart provides examples of how Congress has used its broad Property Clause powers to manage federal lands.
A. The Northwest Ordinance
The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the most significant legislation enacted by the Confederation Congress, passed with near unanimity, reflecting general agreement as to how the federal government should manage the western lands ceded to it by the states. 80 Although the ordinance ratified federal control of the 
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 795 western settlements, the statute also prohibited slavery, 81 established a process to admit new states to the Union "on an equal footing," 82 anticipated federalland sales to repay the Revolutionary War debt, 83 and called for good-faith dealings with local Indian tribes and protection of native property rights. 84 Throughout its text, the statute exhibited anti-colonial and anti-monarchial sentiments, reflecting Thomas Jefferson's ideals. 85 The legislation aimed to promote both widespread land ownership and participation in civic life, 86 consistent with Jeffersonian notions about property. 87 These anti-monopolistic ideas inspired the Property , Contract, Takings, and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, all of which are traceable to the Northwest Ordinance. 88 Before 1784, conflicts with Native Americans impeded settlement of western lands and made for an unstable western frontier. Alexander Hamilton ingeniously proposed that the federal government assume the states' considerable Revolutionary War debts if the states with western claims (about half the original states) ceded their claims to the federal government. 89 After the states largely ratified that deal, 90 the new federal government prioritized the cession of state claims to western lands. New York became the first state to cede title to its claims in 1782, and Virginia came next in 1784. 91 The rest of the states with western-land claims followed. 92 The federal government followed the plan codified in the Northwest Ordinance, and created new republican settlements in the West that eventually became new states, entering the union "on equal footing with the said original states." 93 The focus on equality reflected the anti-colonial sentiment widespread in Revolutionary America.
Managing Western Settlements
The Northwest Ordinance established a framework of surveying and then selling the western lands in an orderly fashion, providing security for individual property rights recognized by the federal government and financing the war debt. 94 The ordinance provided the government with the ability to manage and dispose of lands for the public benefit. Once in possession of western lands, the United States government sold them to settle its Revolutionary War debts. 95 As owner and manager of these lands, the federal government also resolved some of the conflicts animating the West by giving settlers the security of legally recognized title 96 and working with the Native Americans to minimize the risks of war by pledging "good faith" toward them and security for their "property, rights and liberty." 97 The Northwest Ordinance also introduced the concept of compensation for government takings of private land. Article II of the ordinance provided: "[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same." 98 The ordinance's recognition of the federal eminent domain power shows that even after selling lands to settlers, the government retained the ability to take private land for 92. The so-called "landed" states had a great potential advantage over the six "landless" states: the sale of western lands would enrich the landed states, while the landless states feared they would lose residents and significance. 
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 797 public use upon providing just compensation. Thus, as early as 1787, the federal government announced its sovereign authority over private lands as well as declaring that it would use its proprietary power over public lands for the benefit of the public. The Northwest Ordinance created a legal and political framework aimed at promoting the economic and social development of the West. 99 Reflecting antimonopoly sentiment, the ordinance sought to spread land ownership among a large number of settlers. Widespread land ownership created an incentive to participate in political life as a citizen. 100 By providing security of land title, the ordinance sought to invest settlers in the development of stable communities.
Finally, Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance required new states admitted to the Union to not interfere with the disposal of land by the United States or with the title to land granted to bona fide purchasers. 101 This promise of non-interference with federal management reflected federal supremacy over state rules concerning public land and promoted security for individuals who purchased lands from the government. 102
Prohibiting Slavery in the Northwest
Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance declared that "[t]here shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude in the said territory," 103 a provision reflecting the federal government's broad authority to enact laws regulating the lands it owned and to control the disposition of private property rights.
Later, the text of the Property Clause and the cases interpreting it reiterated and amplified this power. Abolishing slavery north of the Ohio River was a republican idea. 104 Prohibiting slavery had important effects on property rights, not merely affecting existing landowners' property rights in the Northwest, but also effectively precluding large, slave-owning plantation owners from moving to the Northwest. The Northwest Ordinance instead favored widespread distribution of property among smaller, independent farmers. 105 By disfavoring large plantation owners, the ordinance reflected the 101. Northwest Ordinance, art. IV. 102. See Festa, supra note 80, at 437. The ordinance was in part a response to the Shays' Rebellion of 1786, which raised questions about the ability of a republican government to provide "an ordered society that would provide security for liberty and property to the yeoman settlers." The ordinance aimed to protect both personal and land rights and, in so doing, root "republicanism in the habits of the people." See Hill, supra note 96, at 52. 
Reducing Inequalities Among States
The Northwest Ordinance called for the admission of new states on "equal footing," conditioned on the guarantee of a republican form of government. 107 Combined with several modifications of property rights that the ordinance implemented, 108 its equal-footing doctrine meant that western lands were the property of the United States, but the federal government would not treat the territories as colonies. 109 Instead, the federal government would act as a trustee and ensure that new states admitted to the Union possessed the same sovereign attributes of the original thirteen states. 110 This trust concept later became important in Supreme 
Disposing of Federal Lands
The Supreme Court's first Property Clause decision concerned a challenge to an 1807 federal statute authorizing the President to lease lead mines on federally owned lands in what became the state of Illinois in 1818. 118 Assuming a position remarkably similar to modern Sagebrush Rebels, 119 John Gratiot argued that Congress possessed authority only to dispose of public lands and make "needful rules and regulations" respecting the preparation of 116. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840); Light, 220 U.S. at 537; United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) . The only exception to the broad interpretation of the Property Clause came in the most reviled Supreme Court decision in constitutional history, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which helped to bring on the Civil War. Scott sued his master to gain his freedom and, after trial, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected his claim for freedom based on his earlier residences in free states and territories. Id. at 398, 431-32. Scott then attempted to collaterally attack that decision in federal court, which rejected his attempt to establish diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 400. The Supreme Court surprisingly accepted certiorari and affirmed. See id. at 454. Justice Taney's opinion for a divided Court relied on the Framers' intent to conclude that Scott, as an African-American, was not a citizen of any state, thus denying him the ability to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 403-29. Although Taney proceeded to examine the Property Clause and conclude that Congress lacked the authority to establish rules for federal territories in the West that were not in the Union at the time of the Constitution, id. at 432-52, that part of the opinion was obiter dicta and not clearly the opinion of a majority of the Court (there were seven opinions in the case). The Supreme Court has never relied on the Property Clause portion of Justice Taney's opinion in any subsequent Supreme Court decision. the lands for sale. 120 He therefore maintained that leasing public lands constituted an unlawful exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. 121 Resolving a divided lower court decision, the Supreme Court rejected Gratiot's argument and decided that Congress had the constitutional authority to dispose of federal property any way it wished, including leasing lead mines. 122 According to the 1840 Court, federal authority over public lands was "without limitation." 123 A long line of Court decisions repeated this language. The Gratiot decision upheld the essentially unreviewable discretion of Congress to lease, sell, or maintain federal lands. The Court added that the state of Illinois could not "claim a right to the public lands within her limits," 124 so the federal Property Clause power remained unaffected by statehood. 125 Over a century later, in United States v. City of San Francisco, the Supreme Court considered the legality of a conditional transfer of interests in federal lands. 126 Congress conveyed public lands to the city for electricity use on the condition that the municipality would sell the electricity directly to the city residents, not to a monopolistic private utility. 127 The city challenged those conditions as beyond the power of Congress. 128 The district court enjoined the city from selling power to Pacific Gas and Electric, a private utility. 129 The Supreme Court affirmed, reiterating that Congress's Property Clause powers were "without limitations," and declaring that the Property Clause permitted "an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it." 130 The Court therefore upheld the conditional transfer of land that forbade the monopolization of hydropower produced on federal lands, illustrating the plenary power of the federal government to manage public lands for the "benefit of the people. 133 Camfield did fence his checkerboarded private lands in such a way as to enclose adjacent public lands as well. 134 At the federal government's request, a lower court enjoined erection of the fence. 135 The court of appeals affirmed, and so did a unanimous Supreme Court. 136 The Court determined that the federal government not only possessed proprietary powers over its own lands, it also held sovereign powers, enabling it to order the removal of fences on private land because they interfered with congressional policy established by the Unlawful Inclosures Act. 137 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brown declared that the "government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several states, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case." 138 Under Camfield, the federal government can employ its authority as a landowner to manage uses on its lands as it sees fit; it may also invoke its sovereign powers to regulate activities on private lands adversely affecting public lands. The Court declared that "[a] different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." 139 Two decades after Camfield, in United States. v. Grimaud, 140 grazers on the federal Sierra Forest Reserve in southern California challenged the authority of the Forest Service to regulate their grazing and charge them for their use of public lands. Pierre Grimaud claimed that the management of the reserve by the Forest Service amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 141 He therefore alleged that requiring grazing permits and fees was unlawful. 142 The district court ruled in favor of Grimaud, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Joseph Lamar. 143 147 The same day that it decided Grimaud, the Court also handed down Light v. United States, 148 a case involving a Colorado grazer who allowed his cattle to graze next to federal land. When the cattle roamed onto the public land, he declined to remove them and-in a claim resembling those raised by the Bundy confrontations-argued that the government could not require him to prevent his cattle from using the adjacent federal land unless the government fenced the forest reserve. 149 Fred Light relied on Colorado state law requiring a landowner to fence his land in order to recover damages for trespass. 150 The lower court found for the government and enjoined Light from cattle trespass on federal lands. 151 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Colorado's fence laws were not a justification for trespassing on the public domain. 152 Citing Buford v. Houtz, 153 the Court declared that the implied consent to roam on unfenced lands under Colorado law conferred no vested rights, and that the federal government retained the power to recall any implied license Light may have enjoyed. 154 Justice Lamar declared that "[t]he United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land, it can do so indefinitely." 155 Light and Grimaud settled the constitutionality of the 1897 Organic Administration Act governing national forest lands and reaffirmed broad congressional power to manage federal lands under the Property Clause, including the ability to preempt conflicting state laws. 156 The Court's next encounter with the Property Clause occurred in the 1917 case of Utah Power and Light v. United States, which concerned a utility's then proceeded to grant the federal government's petition for rehearing, and a year later reversed without a dissent. Decisions like Camfield, Grimaud, Light, and Utah Power made clear that the inclusion of federal lands within state boundaries did not undermine the federal power to control occupancy and use of public lands. 163 Instead, the federal government retained plenary authority to protect its lands from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which users may obtain rights in these federal lands. to notify BLM if they were interfering with his cattle. 167 When BLM refused to allow an auction sale of the horses, the state sued, challenging the constitutionality of the federal statute. 168 The lower court declared the Act unconstitutional and enjoined the federal government from enforcing it, deciding that the wild animals did not become federal property by merely being on federal land; therefore, the government could not regulate them. 169 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, upholding the constitutionality of the Wild Horses Act as a "needful regulation 'respecting' the public lands," 170 and deferring to Congress's determination of what constituted a "needful regulation." 171 The Court also upheld the congressional finding that the horses were an integral part of the natural system of the public lands, 172 expressly rejecting the state's argument that the Enclave Clause limited the government's authority under the Property Clause. 173 Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion noted that even if a state retained jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory under the Enclave Clause, Congress retained the power under the Property Clause to enact legislation affecting federal lands. 174 In case of conflict with state law, the federal legislation prevailed under the Supremacy Clause. 175 Finally, the Kleppe Court qualified its previous holding in Geer v. Connecticut, which upheld broad state power over the taking and possession of wildlife under the "state ownership" doctrine, 176 rejecting the argument that burros are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West; that they contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people; and that these horses and burros are fast disappearing from the American scene. It is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming horses and burros shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands"). 177 Although Kleppe focused on regulation of nonfederal activity on federal public lands, the opinion did suggest that federal authority over wild horses extended to nonfederal lands. 178 Following the case, lower courts consistently reaffirmed broad Property Clause power. 179 For example, in Minnesota v. Block, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress's power included regulation of conduct off of public land that threatened the designated purpose of federal lands. 180 At least within a federal reservation, federal authority includes the ability to impose restrictions on nonfederal lands reasonably related to protecting both the purposes and authorized uses of the federal land. 181
C. Congressional Interpretation of the Property Clause
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Congress gradually shifted federal policy from privatizing public lands to managing them for conservation, recreation, and other public uses. 182 This subpart surveys some of the main statutes that Congress enacted to promote these policies. As early as 1872, Congress reserved public lands in the territories of Montana and Wyoming for what would become the nation's first national park "as a public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people. directed the Interior Secretary to manage Yellowstone National Park, giving the Interior Department a conservation mission for the first time. 184 Two decades after Yellowstone, Congress ushered in a new era when it authorized the Executive to establish forest reserves under the General Revision Act (or Forest Reserve Act) of 1891. 185 The statute enabled the President to create forest reserves by withdrawing public lands from settlement and private appropriation, authority that would eventually establish reservation and management as the dominant federal land policy instead of disposition. 186 In 1897 Congress supplied management directives for the forest reserves in the so-called National Forest Organic Act, which the Court would broadly interpret in its Grimaud, Light, and Utah Power decisions. 187 After the transfer of management of these forest reserves from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture in 1905, the Forest Service became the management agency for the National Forest System under the leadership of the visionary Gifford Pinchot. 188 In 1911 the Supreme Court interpreted the Organic Act to establish the Forest Service as "trustee" of the national forests. 189 In the years following the 1872 reservation of Yellowstone, Congress set aside other lands that would become national parks in 1916, when it enacted the National Park Service Organic Act, establishing the National Park Service and giving it management authority. 190 Earlier, Congress also gave broad authority to the President to designate national monuments in the Antiquities Act of 1906, many of which later became national parks. 
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The Park Service regulates the national parks and most national monuments with the purpose of conserving the scenery, wildlife, and historic resources to leave the reservations "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 192 Today, the National Park System comprises more than four hundred different areas, 193 illustrating the repeated use of Congress's Property Clause powers to manage and protect federal lands for public benefit.
After establishing a new framework to provide for the reservation of public lands in national forests, parks, and similar areas for conservation purposes, Congress turned its focus to more specific land-use activities, principally out of concern over overexploitation of mineral resources. This concern resulted in a policy shift in managing public lands containing oil. obtain accounting of oil extracted after the withdrawal. 195 After the lower court dismissed the suit, the government appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which certified certain questions to the Supreme Court. 196 The Court upheld the oil withdrawals in 1915 in United States v. Midwest Oil Company, citing longstanding congressional acquiescence to executive-branch land withdrawals. 197 Five years later, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 withdrew fuel minerals like oil, gas, and coal from the 1872 law and authorized leasing, with the federal government retaining title to the leased lands. 198 The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 199 marked a major shift toward land retention and conservation, effectively ending the disposition era. 200 In the 1920s and early 1930s, unreserved western lands suffered large-scale degradation from excessive grazing and drought, prompting Congress to enact the Taylor Act to "stop injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration [and] to provide for their orderly use, improvement, and development." 201 The statute reflected congressional awareness of the unsustainability of unregulated grazing practices and established the Grazing Service in the Interior Department, later combined with the General Land Office to form BLM in 1946. 202 The federal government proceeded to issue grazing permits on some 16 million acres of public lands under ten-year leases from 1934 to 1968. 203 In the 1960s, new BLM regulations recognized a "multiple-use management" policy. 204 This policy committed BLM to more active management, but Congress did not permanently codify multiple-use management 205 [T]he public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife. . . . 209 FLPMA granted broad authority to BLM to manage public lands, formalized multiple-use, sustained yield management, and established environmental protection as a purpose of public-land management. 210 The statute expressly recognized the priority of protecting lands with high environmental value for public benefit. 211 With the enactment of FLPMA, Congress largely completed a comprehensive framework to conserve and manage resources on public lands to preserve parks, forests, grazing lands, and surface and subsurface resources. 212 Federal management of public lands for the benefit of the people is thus a wellsettled national policy, a reflection of the overwhelmingly shared concern for the protection and sound management of publicly-owned lands and natural resources. The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch all have clearly and broadly interpreted the power to manage federal lands under the Property Clause. 
III. THE DISCONTENTS' LEGAL CLAIMS
The anti-environmental movement called the "Sagebrush Rebellion" began in the 1970s, mostly growing out of unhappiness among grazers and some states with the decision in NRDC v. Morton. 213 That decision ordered BLM to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) on its land-use plans, which threatened grazing restrictions. 214 The then-director of the Utah BLM office predicted in 1980 that the legal uncertainty caused by the rebellion would "bring all actions on public lands to a halt for ten years." 215 When the Reagan Administration (led by a self-proclaimed sagebrush rebel) took office, newly appointed Interior Secretary James Watt questioned the science underlying the EISs and stated that he would always "err on the side of public use versus preservation." 216 He refused to accept any grazing restrictions based on the EISs, a position upheld in NRDC v. Hodel, which approved a BLM land plan that largely ignored the need to improve degraded public rangeland through grazing restrictions. 217 As a result, there was no definitive legal ruling on the rebels' claims that the federal government lacked authority to cut back grazing, although the decisions in Kleppe v. New Mexico 218 (on the scope of the Property Clause power) and in Arizona v. California 219 (limiting the equalfooting doctrine to submerged lands beneath navigable-in-fact waters at the time of statehood) put the handwriting on the wall concerning those types of claims.
The rebellion against federal authority resurfaced in the 1990s when Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt (from a ranching family) announced his "rangeland reform" program, which called for more environmentally sensitive public-land grazing. 220 Grazers responded by filing suit in federal district court 
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in Nevada, arguing that the federal government lost title to lands of the state when Nevada joined the Union. 221 The grazers also argued that federal ownership of 80 percent of land within the state unconstitutionally infringed on the state's police powers and violated the equal-footing doctrine by putting the state at an economic disadvantage compared to other states. 222 But the grazers' equal footing, Tenth Amendment, and Statehood Act claims failed in the Ninth Circuit. 223 Undaunted, the grazers and the states have advanced new legal theories, none of which has succeeded, as we explain below.
A. State Water Rights as a Limit on Federal Land Use Discretion
Western public-lands ranchers advanced another theory that their state water rights on federal lands provide them with implied easements to graze on public lands so their cattle can access the water. Although the argument has met with some success in the lower courts, appellate courts have consistently rejected it. 224 The latest judicial rejection occurred early in 2016 when the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the government against the estate of the late rancher Wayne Hage in a trespass case. 225 Hage and his son held a federal grazing permit until 1993, but failed to renew it properly. 226 When they continued to graze cattle on federal lands, the federal government sued in trespass. 227 The district court ruled for the Hages, concluding that their state water rights gave them an easement by necessity for their cows to access the water on public lands. 228 The Ninth Circuit summarily reversed, 229 holding that "the ownership of water rights has no effect on the requirement that a rancher obtain a grazing permit." 230 The court relied on case law from both federal and Nevada state courts in determining that "water rights do not include, as a matter of state law, an implicit, appurtenant grazing right on federal lands," because the Taylor Grazing Act preempted any such state rights. 231 Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have now clearly rejected the argument that water rights perfected under state law entitle ranchers to graze their cattle on federal land adjacent to a water source. 232 
B. Public Grass as a Private Property Right
Ranchers have also argued for a kind of "labor theory of grass." 233 They maintain that, because their families have been grazing on public lands for a long period of time, they acquired rights to the grass on those lands, even though the Taylor Act clearly stipulated that federal grazing permits gave them "no right, title, or interest" in public lands. 234 The grazers' argument resembles the common-law doctrine of accession, which, according to a nearly centuryold account, "comprehends the case of one who by his labor and skill, has created a new product out of another's article." 235 Their claim would be based on their cultivation of public land grass, which allegedly provides the dominant value of the lands. But accession law is premised on private land ownership, not land owned by the sovereign. 236 Moreover, it is hardly clear that the chief value of the public rangelands is grass devoted to livestock grazing, not the wildlife and watershed values that grazing damages.
The grazer's argument also founders on the fact that they have no ownership to the land on which the grass grows, and the federal statute authorizing their permits expressly denies them land rights. 237 Courts have not yet had the opportunity to consider the grazers' "grass ownership" argument, but they may soon. Using the accession-related common-law doctrine of emblements, 238 the grazers might argue that the grass is a crop that they nurtured as tenants of a federal grazing permit, and that even after the termination of a lease, they are entitled to the value of the grass they
2016]
THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 813 produced. 239 However, the doctrine of emblements applies only to indefinite lease terms, 240 which federal grazing permits do not have. Moreover, the grazers could, at best, obtain a remedy equaling the value of one season of grass.
The grazers might also analogize their grass-ownership argument to what the Supreme Court once referred to as "constituent elements of the land," concerning claims to minerals and timber in connection with an Indian reservation in United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians. 241 In that case, the tribe sought compensation from the federal government for settling a different tribe on part of the reservation in violation of its treaty. The government acknowledged that it owed the Shoshone Tribe compensation but claimed the valuation should not include the value of the land's timber and minerals. 242 The Court ruled against the government because it had it assured the tribe "peaceable and unqualified possession of the land in perpetuity," which implicitly included minerals and timber as constituent elements of the land; otherwise, the reservation would transfer little in the way of beneficial interest. 243 But the government made no similar promise to public-land grazers; in fact, it clearly stated that grazing permits were at the discretion of the federal government. 244 Moreover, the Indian law rule of construing agreements with the government in favor of the tribes 245 does not apply to the public-land grazing context, where a contrary interpretative rule favors the federal government in disputes with its grantees. 246 Finally, ranchers were never the beneficiaries of a land reservation held by the government as a trustee for them, as is the case with tribes. 247 The federal government is not a trustee for public- 
C. The Enclave Clause as a Limit on Federal Lands
Krisanne Hall, speaking on behalf of the grazers, has advanced the novel theory that the federal government's authority to own land covers only ten square-miles from Washington, D.C. under the Enclave Clause. 249 Her claim overlooks more than a century of Enclave Clause case law, which has uniformly interpreted the clause liberally. 250 For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the language "needful Buildings" in the clause to include dams 251 and a national park. 252 The Enclave Clause has, moreover, never been interpreted to limit federal authority under the Property Clause. 253 Eleven western state attorneys general recently agreed that that the former does not limit the latter. 254 As discussed above, the consistent judicial interpretation of the Property Clause is "without limitation." 255
D. The Supreme Court's Alleged Misinterpretation of the Property Clause
Ammon Bundy adopted a somewhat different approach from Hall's judicial review argument in his defense in the Malheur Refuge case. 256 Although he acknowledged the judicial review power of the Supreme Court, he argued that the federal government has no authority over that refuge, and that the Court's two-hundred-year jurisprudence regarding the Property Clause powers of the government should be overturned. 257 Bundy rejected the extensive case law described above in Part II and argued that the Constitution "only intended to give broad federal power of property in Territories, as the Founders contemplated the expansion westward." 258 Bundy's argument relies on the use of "Territories" in the Enclave Clause, rather than "territories" in the Property Clause. 259 He contends that "Territories," as a proper noun, reflected the Founders' intent to recognize federal power only over territorial lands that existed at the time of the drafting of the Constitution. 260 Since Oregon was not a territory in 1787, Bundy claims "once statehood occurred for Oregon, Congress lost the right to own the land inside the state," except for purposes of the Enclave Clause. 261 Bundy's contention that "Territories" versus "territories" or "lands" has constitutional significance was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court 176 years ago in United States v. Gratiot. 262 In 1840 the Court interpreted the term "Territories" in the Property Clause as "equivalent to the word lands," 263 meaning that the government has jurisdiction over all public lands, not just those "Territories" that existed at the time of the drafting of the Property Clause in 1787. In fact, Bundy's reasoning echoes Justice Taney's discredited analysis of the Property Clause in Dred Scott-that Congress lacked the authority to establish rules for federal territories in the West that were not part of the Union at the time of the Constitution. 264 265. Justice Taney claimed that the Clause "does not speak of any territory, nor of Territories, but uses language which, according to its legitimate meaning, points to a particular thing" to argue the term "territory" could only refer to the area ceded by Virginia and New York and covered by the Northwest Ordinance. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 436, 446-47 (1857) (emphasis in original); see also Appel, supra note 25, at 46 ("Purely from an analysis of the legal reasoning, Taney's opinion in Dred Scott is disturbing. To reach his conclusion, Taney belittled the text of the Constitution and ignored or misconstrued several key cases interpreting congressional power over the territories."). ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.43:781
Bundy's argument also ignored the fact that the Supreme Court has already upheld federal ownership of Malheur Refuge. 266 In United States v. Oregon, the federal government sued the state to quiet title to submerged lands underlying three lakes within the Lake Malheur Reservation, established by executive order in 1908. 267 The Supreme Court upheld the executive order establishing Lake Malheur as a bird reservation as within the authority of the President. 268 The Court also decided that the lakebeds were federally owned, directly contrary to Bundy's argument that once Oregon joined the Union, the government lost the power to manage public lands in the state. 269 Since the lakes were non-navigable at the time of Oregon's 1859 statehood, the state never obtained title to the lakebeds under the equal-footing doctrine when it joined the Union. 270 Consequently, Bundy's argument was not only inconsistent with nearly two centuries of jurisprudence, but also contradicted a Supreme Court decision affirming federal ownership of Malheur Wildlife Refuge.
E. Utah's "Equal Sovereignty" and "Equal Footing" Claims
In connection with Utah's TPLA, a New Orleans firm hired by the state suggested that the state might have a valid claim under the so-called "equal sovereignty" and "equal footing" principles. 271 The "equal sovereignty" idea is essentially a restatement of political equal footing, which does not have a proprietary dimension. 272 The law firm argued that FLPMA, by reversing almost two hundred years of public-land policy "from one of disposal to one of near permanent retention," constituted an infringement on Utah's sovereignty as compared to states that have fewer federal lands within their borders. 273 The firm suggested that the state might obtain a judicial declaration that the federal government cannot forever retain the public lands within Utah's borders. The firm's recommendation seems premised on the idea that "equal sovereignty" requires more than equal political sovereignty. All states enjoy the latter: two senators, proportionate representation in the House of Representatives, and electoral votes equal to the congressional representatives. This political representation separates states from territories like Puerto Rico and the seat of the federal government in the District of Columbia. But political equal sovereignty has never meant equal proprietary holdings. Given the numerous allocation difficulties such an interpretation would raise, it is quite unlikely that a court would reinterpret political sovereignty to include equal proprietary ownership.
The Supreme Court has rejected expanding the scope of state equalfooting claims many times. The Court's 1845 decision in Pollard v. Hagan decided that new states obtained ownership through an implicit federal transfer of the beds of navigable waters at statehood. 275 But in subsequent decisions the Court firmly declined to expand the doctrine to offshore submerged lands 276 and to lands above the high water mark. 277 Moreover, all of the western states specifically disclaimed ownership of the federal public lands within their boundaries in their statehood acts. 278 No court has ever suggested that these disclaimers were unconstitutional or unenforceable. 279 The discontents' legal claims therefore have little prospect of judicial success. They may, however, have more success in the political arena, to which we turn in the next Part.
IV. THE DISCONTENTS' POLITICAL PROSPECTS
With little prospect of success in the courts, the discontents' claims might receive a more welcome reception in Congress, which has the constitutional power to dispose of federal lands. This Part examines a bill advanced by firm contended that the "compact theory" enjoyed "historical support," the Utah Enabling Act actually included a disclaimer of non-interference by the state. See infra note 319. The analysis cited no evidence of "historical support" for continued disposition, and at the time of Utah statehood in 1896, the federal government had already reserved Yellowstone and what would become Hot Springs National Parks, and Congress had authorized the President to reserve forest lands. So, this argument-which amounts to saying that a statehood act could restrain congressional authority under the Property Clause-actually lacks "historical support." The Western states attorneys general agree, see infra notes 301, 306. Congressman Rob Bishop (R-Utah) that would authorize conveying public lands from the federal government to the state of Utah. 280 The Part also explains a new generation of local planning ordinances, which could fuel further political debate concerning the ability of local governments to control nearby federal lands.
A. Congressman Bishop's "Grand Settlement" in Utah
Congressman Bishop has been pushing for a so-called "grand settlement" between Utah's environmental groups, which wish to expand wilderness areas in the state, and oil and gas interests, which seek to open federal lands for fossil-fuel production. 281 Bishop's proposal resulted from negotiations among local and national environmental groups, recreationalists, tribes, ranchers, oil and gas companies, and county commissioners over lands in eastern Utah. 282 In January 2016, Bishop unveiled a draft bill that would designate a total of 4.3 million acres of new wilderness and national conservation areas, as well as 301 new miles of wild and scenic rivers. 283 The bill would also authorize the transfer of some federal land to the state and designate other BLM lands as priority areas for oil and gas development, grazing, and motorized vehicle use. 284 Although the Western Energy Alliance (representing some 450 oil and gas companies) called the bill an "important milestone," environmental groups described the bill as worse than the status quo because it contained many loopholes allowing activities usually prohibited in wilderness areas and wilderness study areas. 285 The Bishop bill would also curb the authority of the President to designate national monuments under the Antiquities Act without congressional approval, 286 This attempt at a "grand bargain"-trading modified wilderness designations for state control of oil and gas development-may gain political support in the wake of the 2016 election that united all branches of the federal government under Republican control. 288 
B. Local Land Planning Ordinances
Local governments can have an important effect on public-land management. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and FLPMA both call for coordination of state and local plans in federal land plans. 289 Some local ordinances have interpreted the term "coordination" to mean governmentto-government negotiations on virtually all land uses. 290 However, local governments have long assumed that federal-land management was outside the scope of community concern. 291 Recently, however, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has drafted local ordinances challenging federal control of public lands in the West. 292 Encouraged by ALEC, some local ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.43:781 governments have enacted ordinances in an effort to obtain greater control over federal public-land management. 293 Although these sorts of local ordinances might not be enforceable, 294 they could inspire amendments to NFMA and FLPMA to make them enforceable. When federal agencies' decisions seem arbitrary to local populations, the agencies may influence local governments to oppose federal-land planning and regulation, and push for local ordinances to interfere with federal planning. The feeling of distrust toward the federal government is catalyzed by the fact that the decisions of a distant entity regarding wildlife protection, watershed conservation, and management of other natural resources can affect the grazer's ability to manage land to which they feel entitled. 295 Local visions of the public interest in public-land management will likely reflect the heavy influence that extractive industries can bring to bear on local communities due to the creation of local employment and contributions to both local taxes and campaign expenditures of local politicians. 296 Although that vision would not be consistent with national perception of the public interest, as reflected in statutes like NFMA and FLPMA, local plans could influence Congress to change those statutes. Prospects for success here seem much more likely than in any court action.
CONCLUSION
The Malheur Refuge was an odd place for revolt against public-land management because the local population generally accepted the refuge management plan, evidenced by the fact that there was no appeal filed after the plan's promulgation. 297 In fact, most of the occupiers of the wildlife refuge did not even come from Oregon. 298 Yet, the Bundys seized the opportunity presented by the sentencing of two local ranchers to obtain publicity for their 293 . See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY, OR., NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (2015); see also Bryan, supra note 291, at 149 (arguing that the growing involvement of the local communities is the product of a lack of collaboration and inconsistent federal agency policies). 
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 821 cause. 299 Although Malheur was not the first confrontation of this kind, its length and violence (including the death of one protester) raise broader concerns in the fight opposing federal agencies' efforts to protect and restore areas of federal public lands for their recreational and ecological values. 300 The Malheur occupation represents only the latest of a long history of unsuccessful opposition against the Constitution's Property Clause. 301 This opposition is not surprising given the deep feeling of distrust among some westerners towards the federal government, a distant entity making decisions affecting highly interested locals who usually favor commodity production over water quality, wildlife habitat, and natural resource preservation. 302 The tension between these two competing interests-local interests versus national interests-can now quickly escalate into highly mediatized armed conflicts like the Malheur Refuge, due in large part to the outsized influence of social media. 303 However, discontents like the Bundys are misguided about the legal merits of their opposition. 304 Although some of those involved in the Malheur occupation may still serve prison time, 305 sympathizers of the Bundy cause may have better prospects in the political arena, as Congress has broad powers to dispose of public lands under two hundred years of consistent Property Clause jurisprudence. 301. Utah's latest effort to take public lands away from the federal government also seems ill founded, as eleven attorneys general, including the Republican attorney general from Utah, recently concluded that "Congress may retain ownership of public lands indefinitely." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 66, at 16. The same report also found that the Enclave Clause did not limit the scope of the Property Clause, id. at 2, 17-21, and that neither the equal footing nor the so-called equal sovereignty doctrines required federal conveyance of public lands to the states. Id. at 2-3, 22-47. Because federal lands have always been central to Americans' vision of their identity, 307 Congress and the President should exercise great caution in any reform of public-land-management policies. 308 Divestiture would radically change public-land law-even the Western states attorney generals agree 309 -and is inconsistent with its long history of anti-monopoly policy, 310 and it would surely engender great opposition and litigation. 311 The Malheur Refuge standoff might not be the last of its kind in Oregon. One might think of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's insight about possession sinking into one's being, the so-called "endowment effect" (or divestiture aversion). 312 This seems especially characteristic of the psychology of grazers who have used federal lands for generations, even without any recognized land ownership rights.
In any event, the disturbing confrontation that took place at the Malheur Refuge shed light on an alleged lack of communication between federal agencies and local populations. If more federal-local coordination is necessary, armed insurrection by opportunistic ranchers like the Bundys, taking advantage of a mediatized event to advance their personal agendas, is hardly the vehicle to produce it. Nor is wholesale conveyance of federal lands, a position adopted by the 2016 Republican Party platform. 313 Gifting land to states that cannot afford the burden of managing federal lands could lead to the privatization of a common heritage possessed by all Americans. 314 Improved cooperation 307. Public-lands retention was the great achievement of the Progressive Conservation Era. The national park system the Progressives inaugurated is not only among the most popular federal programs (although federal land reservations antedated the Progressives, reaching back to pre-constitutional America, see supra note 118), it is also quite central to Americans' vision of themselves. See, e.g., PETER COATES, NATURE: WESTERN ATTITUDES SINCE ANCIENT TIMES 108 (1998):
Nature was a vital cohesive force in a country that lacked the glue of ethnic, religious and racial homogeneity. Reinforcing the shared commitment to republicanism, democracy and free enterprise, a literal sense of common ground could mitigate the centrifugal tendencies of heterogeneity. The fabled frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1893), which rooted American culture, character and intellect firmly in the unmodified nature that colonists encountered on the frontier, represented the culmination of a way of thinking about nature as a moral quality imbued with a redemptive virtue that rubbed off almost magically on those who came into contact with it, metamorphosing Europeans into Americans. 
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between federal-land managers and local communities obviously would promote a better means of addressing local concerns than the Bundys' violent insurrection. Both of the major land-management statutes-FLPMA and NFMArequire the federal agencies to coordinate with states and local governments. 315 States and localities are more likely now than in the past to seek to enforce those provisions. Some localities are even preparing land plans for federal lands in their vicinity. 316 Although limits exist as to what local plans can accomplish, 317 they will doubtless achieve more than the Bundys' clumsy effort at constitutional revolution.
In a larger sense, the Bundy occupation reflects a conflict between concepts of land ownership and usufructuary rights, 318 which only allow the use of the land without altering or impairing it. Both are property rights, but usufructuary rights-like federal grazing rights-can ripen into land ownership only in unusual circumstances, none of which are present in the case of federalland grazing. 319 Moreover, the general public has great affinity to the lands it owns and uses, and therefore feels the endowment effect identified by Justice Holmes no less strongly than public-land grazers. 320 Both have expectations, and the general public's are much more widely possessed and more firmly grounded in law and history.
Despite the lack of any colorable legal merit of the Bundy occupation, the effort illustrates some political support for a revolution in federal public-land management. 321 Yet, before states launch serious efforts to de-federalize public lands, they should consider whether they can afford to manage the lands and continue the current subsidies afforded to users like grazers. 322 Grazers benefit from low fees and federal programs like those supporting predator-control ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.43:781 measures. 323 Existing federal subsidies are perhaps unobjectionable if they provide the public widespread benefits like maintaining water quality standards and promoting watershed and wildlife protection, but the restraints that accompany such measures are the root cause of the discontents' dissatisfaction with federal control. Any serious measures to transfer federal public lands to the states must also possess publicly enforceable conditions ensuring the continuation of those public benefits and prohibitions against privatization or monopolization. 324 Given recent evidence that many Western counties oppose land transfers to the states, 325 states should weigh whether such transfers actually further local interests. But in the final analysis, given that even politically unpopular designations of conservation units like Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southeastern Utah produced widespread economic benefits, 326 the discontents' political agenda should meet with congressional skepticism. The long-term intergenerational costs of the loss of federal public-land rights would clearly outweigh any short-term profits from state conveyancing or privatization.
POSTSCRIPT
On October 27, 2016, while this article was in press, the jury in the Malheur occupation case acquitted the occupants of a conspiracy to deprive federal employees of their right to work and weapons charges. There's no
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THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 825 assured way of knowing why the jury acquitted the occupants. 327 Perhaps the case was poorly prosecuted. Perhaps the government did a poor job of voir dire in selecting the jury. Perhaps the jury instructions were flawed. Perhaps the jury did not understand the law underpinning the government's authority to own and manage public lands. Perhaps the result was simply jury nullification of laws the jury members did not like. There is a long history of jury nullification dating back to the eighteenth century in pre-Revolutionary America. 328 Whatever the reason for the acquittal, the result of the case does nothing to change the underlying law discussed in this article. But the result could foster political momentum to encourage Congress to exercise its constitutional authority under the Property Clause to dispose of federal public lands to states or private entities. There may be some limits as to those lands which Congress may dispose, 329 but those limits are largely undefined.
The overriding lesson from the Malheur occupation may be that although the underlying law clearly supports federal ownership of public lands, the discontents' claims have political resonance. Whether they have sufficient political resonance to support congressional disposition is a question that will be answered in the coming years. One would hope that the issue would be debated openly and publicly by elected officials, not accomplished through low-level congressional appropriation riders or other subterfuges. The American people-all of the American public, not just those in close proximity to the lands they hope to control-deserve to be involved in what would be an historic change in the relationship that the American people have had with their federal public lands.
Twelve days after the jury acquitted the Malheur defendants, Donald J. Trump was elected the forty-fifth president of the United States. On December 13, 2016, the press reported that the president-elect chose Montana Republican Congressman Ryan Zinke as Secretary of Interior after deciding against another finalist for the position, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Republican 327. After the verdict, one juror explained that the jury did not think it could rely on the defendants' "defining actions" to convict them but instead to determine if "any agreement was made with an illegal object in mind," which the juror stated was "lost on the prosecution throughout." That juror suggested that the jury was influenced by the distinction that the defense lawyers drew between the "'effect' of the occupation-which undoubtedly kept federal employees from doing their jobs-from the 'intent' of the occupiers," noting that "[i]nference, while possibly compelling, proved to be insulting or inadequate to 12 diversely situated people as a means to convict" because "[t]he air of triumphalism that the prosecution brought was not lost on any of us, nor was it warranted given their burden of proof." See Maxine Bernstein, Juror: Prosecutors Failed to Prove 'Intent,' to Impede Federal Workers, OREGONIAN (Oct. 29, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/10/juror_4_prosecutors_ in_oregon.html (quoting from Juror 4, a college student at Marylhurst University, who thought the government failed to prove the fundamental elements of the alleged conspiracy charge). 
